The recent calls from Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Shigeru Ishiba to form Asian North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) demonstrate anxieties in Indo-Pacific countries about managing China’s rise and the resulting imbalances that dominate the region. The minister expressed hopes on several fronts, including “cooperative security relationship[s]” and “mutual defence obligations” for ensuring stability. It also allayed Chinese concerns by signalling that such grouping will be inclusive and open to Chinese participation. But China remains the only cause for resurrecting the idea of Asian NATO to match Beijing’s power in the region. Similarly, reminiscing over the early decades of the Cold War, the origins of Asian NATO belied docking Communist expansionism, spearheaded by China and the erstwhile Soviet Union in the region.
In 1952, British secretary of state for foreign affairs Anthony Eden authored a paper titled British Oversees Obligations, recommending Britain to prune its security responsibilities in Asia and West Asia by forming multilateral security arrangements to share the financial burdens and persuade American participation. In Asia, Eden prescribed to form the Far Eastern Regional Security Pact, identical to NATO operating in the European continent. By doing so, Britain also intended to control the reins of American provocation against the Chinese, especially after the Korean crisis in 1951, which may have resulted in World War III, dragging Britain into it.
Only after two years, in the backdrop of the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu against the Viet-Minh on March 13, 1954, was the United States (US) finally convinced to forge a collective multilateral to preclude communist expansion in Asia. On March 29, John Foster Dulles declared the threat of Communist expansion against the “free community”. To broker a deal between opposing sides in Indo-China, the Geneva conference was rolled, reaching an armistice on July 21, 1954 stipulating a peaceful resolution. Washington dismissed Geneva’s formula as a setback to forming a “defence zone” and speculated that China might condone more Communist uprisings earmarked for Asian instability.
Against this threatening reception, Anglo-American policymakers decided to form the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954, also referred to as the Manila Pact. It included only two Southeast Asian countries—Thailand and Philippines— and Pakistan, as the only South Asian country—signalling Asian wariness against collective defence arrangements. Considerably a looser organisation than NATO, SEATO proved elusive in expanding its membership as neutrals like India, Burma (Myanmar), and Indonesia employed pacific diplomacy to curtail membership of smaller nations. India and China worked out their difference on Tibet in April 1954. They also later engaged in several high-level meetings, specifically in June and October 1954, to counteract western plans of forming SEATO by concluding five-principles of peaceful coexistence as a dictum in Asia.
While such efforts are commendable, India and China are not the only countries that desire a peaceful Asia. Colombo powers including Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Pakistan, also championed against intervention in Indo-China and urged countries to show restraint. Occurring parallel to developments in Southeast Asia, Colombo powers set the tone for their inclusion (as neutrals) into the Geneva negotiation, endorsed by Anthony Eden. Not only this but as SEATO was formalised, Colombo powers called for the inception of the Bandung conference, which a year later convened, to show disagreements against the American template to securitise Southeast Asia.
The formation of SEATO not only troubled Colombo powers and China but also diluted Nehru’s vision for Asia. In a secret memo to Nehru on April 12, 1954, infuriated Krishna Menon mentioned that SEATO would undermine India’s strategy of the “area of peace”, which envisages steering Southeast Asia clear from any great power intervention. Seeing his vision getting trampled, Nehru pushed Zhou En Lai to conclude understanding with Burma and Indonesia based on five principles of peaceful coexistence to dispel Southeast Asia’s perception of China as an aggressor. Nehru, by internationalising these principles, reasoned that such foreign policy posture would alleviate smaller powers concerns against China and India’s design on their territorial integrity. China, on the other hand, mooted that signing “non-aggression pacts” buttressing five principles of peaceful coexistence would considerably rob SEATO of its purpose—defending Southeast Asia against China’s expansionism. Nehru rejected such ideas because it violated India’s non-alignment policy.
Ultimately, the efforts of Nehru and other powers to shun the militarised coalition yielded significant payoffs. A 1960 document by the British Foreign Office, titled Neutralism in South and Southeast Asia, revealed that no neutral country joined the SEATO. However, “one formerly committed state, Ceylon [Sri Lanka], has turned to neutralism.” That points to the failure of SEATO to take root in Asia.
Fast forward to today, the calls for Asian NATO is still impracticable. As India’s external affairs minister, S Jaishankar, stated, India can “never be a part of an alliance system”. India’s foreign policy posture decries coalition-building; therefore, the proliferation of minilateral arrangements in the region is more desired. Unlike NATO in Europe, which offers deterrence in the entire European continent and seeks to go global, minilateral arrangements—AUKUS, Quad, US-Japan-Philippines—are more specific, targeted and operate in the subset of the Indo-Pacific region to deter China. Southeast Asian countries are also governed by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) pledges that shun calls for joining military coalitions and taking sides.
Against this reluctance for military coalition, the Asia Power Index, unveiled yearly by Lowy Institute, revealed that the Indo-Pacific is dominated by bipolarity—with the US and China as the leading powers. India has problems with China—border disputes—and other Southeast Asian countries are also worried about China’s behaviour, especially about its assertive South China Sea policy against Vietnam and the Philippines. The recent tilt towards Washington is aimed at pushback against Beijing’s power. Inevitably, most Asian countries resist the Cold War mentality and push for multipolarity—multiple power centres—to serve their strategic interest.
Nonetheless, if China desires hegemony in Asia, as evident in its New Security Concept, these States are left with only two options: Buttress the traditional hub-and-spokes model that calls for a network of bilateral ties between the US and other Indo-Pacific partners or create a collective defence system as envisaged by the Japanese PM. The latter’s feasibility is minimal; however, an attempt to revamp networks of bilateral military ties along with regional minilaterals will inevitably result in shaping deterrence against China, which is already a powerful pole in the world order.
This article is authored by Rahul Jaybhay, research analyst, Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi.